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1. Introduction 
This opinion piece is intended as a rejoinder to/extension of my own previous 
proposal in Hoshi (2018), critically reexamining the hypothesis of categorization 
origin of Merge and labeling in an attempt to rectify mistakes while aiming at 
theoretical refinement. In the ensuing discussion, I will address the following 
three claims made in Hoshi (2018): 
 
(i) Categorization has two modes of operation, the interrelational mode 
of categorization (IntCat) and the differentiational mode (DifCat); 
Merge is derived by ‘exapting/co-opting’ the recursive set-formation 
sub-component of IntCat.1 
(ii) Categorization targets either a series of entities or a series of category 
sets.  
(iii) Merge is derived by detaching the labeling sub-component of IntCat. 
 
Concerning (i), I will claim that the two apparently distinct modes of 
operation of categorization stem from differences of ‘extraction patterns’ and 
thus as a precursor of Merge the particular mode of categorization such as IntCat 
should not be stipulated.  
As for (ii), I will make clear the relation between the low-order categori-
zation involving a series of entities and the higher-order categorization involving 
a series of category sets in humans and non-human animals, in connection with 
the qualitative difference of the two types of categorization between them in the 
context of the evolution of human language.  
 
       Part of the material in this piece was presented in earlier slightly different forms at the 
Evolinguistics Workshop 2019 (University of Tokyo, 25 May 2019) and at the International 
Cognitive Linguistics Conference 15 (Kwansei Gakuin University, 9 August 2019). I would 
like to express my gratitude to the audiences on those occasions for valuable questions and 
comments, particularly Koji Fujita, Shin-ichi Tanaka, Daiki Matsumoto, Toshiyuki Kuma-
shiro, and Sotaro Kita. I am also very grateful to editor-in-chief Kleanthes K. Grohmann and 
other associate editors of Biolinguistics for extremely useful suggestions on the revision of 
the earlier version. All the remaining errors and inadequacies are, of course, solely my own 
responsibility. This work was supported by MEXT/JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific 
Research on Innovative Areas #4903 (Evolinguistics), Grant Number JP17H06379. 
    1 Note that this pattern indeed fits with exaptation in that the recursive set-formation 
operation that originally had the function for implementing categorization subsequently 
came to serve another function for implementing Merge in syntax (see Gould & Vrba 1982). 
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Finally, with regard to (iii), I will make a specific claim about the relation 
between labeling in categorization and labeling in syntax, proposing a possible 
novel explanation of the binarity of Merge due to the very nature of the origin of 
labeling for syntactic objects from labeling for categorization.2 
 
2. Categorization Origins of Merge and Labeling Reconsidered 
2.1. No Need for Specifying the Particular Mode of Categorization IntCat as a 
Precursor of Merge  
The hypothesis of categorization origin of Merge advanced in Hoshi (2018) is 
based on a reinterpretation of Lenneberg’s view of biological evolution of the 
function of language from a perspective of modern linguistic theorizing. Lenne-
berg (1967) states that “the cognitive function underlying human language 
consists of an adaptation of a ubiquitous process (among vertebrates) of 
categorization and extraction of similarities”3 (p. 374). Furthermore, with respect 
to categorization, Lenneberg originally remarks as follows: 
 
[M]ost animals organize the sensory world by a process of categorization, and 
from this basic mode of organization two further processes derive: 
differentiation or discrimination, and interrelating of categories or the 
perception of and tolerance for transformations […]. In man these organi-
zational activities are usually called concept-formation; but it is clear that 
there is no formal difference between man’s concept-formation and animal’s 
propensity for responding to categories of stimuli. There is, however, a 
substantive difference. The total possibilities for categorization are clearly 
not identical across species.   (Lenneberg 1967: 331; emphasis mine—KH) 
 
First of all, observe Figure 1 below, which illustrates schematically two patterns of 
categorization (see also Hoshi 2018: 41). There are two sub-categories, C2 and C3, 
which are contained in a more comprehensive super-category, C1. One pattern of 
categorization implicit in this figure is that the two sub-categories are subsumed 
under the super-category; in turn, the other pattern concealed here is that the 
more inclusive super-category C1 is subdivided into the two more specific sub-
categories C2 and C3. 
 
    2 In the field of cognitive linguistics, Langacker (1997) proposes the cognitive operation for 
symbolic assembly called ‘Grouping’, which is virtually on a par with Merge in the mini-
malist program (Chomsky 1995 et seq.). There are, however, some differences between 
Merge and Grouping: (i) while Merge is binary, Grouping is not necessarily thus restricted, 
and (ii) Merge allows for both external and internal variety, whereas Grouping permits only 
external variety, meaning that it lacks movement (see Langacker 1991). On the other hand, 
there is a common property in Merge and Grouping: Both are characterized as label-free 
(see Chomsky 2013, 2015 for Merge and see Langacker 1997 for Grouping). I will put aside a 
systematic comparison between Merge and Grouping in this opinion piece, leaving it to 
future research.   
    3 The term ‘adaptation’ in the quote does not mean adaptation to the environment but refers 
to structural innovations on a DNA molecular level (see Lenneberg 1967: 72). An investi-
gation into the genetics of this adaptation is of course beyond the scope of this opinion piece, 
but I will speculate what kind of qualitative change in the ubiquitous process of 
categorization could have occurred in our species in the following discussion. 
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Figure 1: Two Patterns of Categorization  
 
As already stated at the outset, in Hoshi (2018), I called the former ‘inter-
relational mode of categorization’ (IntCat) and the latter ‘differentiational mode 
of categorization’ (DifCat). I proposed that Merge was derived from IntCat by 
‘exapting/co-opting’ the set-formation sub-component of IntCat and detaching 
the labeling sub-component of it, while preserving the ability of IntCat per se in 
the course of the biological evolution of human language in our species (see 
Hoshi 2018: 47).4 
In Hoshi (2018), I did not address the relation between the two modes of 
categorization and two distinct extraction patterns. Recall Lenneberg’s (1967) 
thesis that “the cognitive function underlying human language consists of an 
adaptation of a ubiquitous process (among vertebrates) of categorization and ex-
traction of similarities” mentioned above (my emphasis—KH).5 Strictly speaking, 
extraction of similarities does not hold for categorization in general. Only IntCat 
is carried out on the basis of extraction of similarities. Hence, in Figure 1, IntCat of 
C2 and C3 to form C1 will be done by extracting similarities between C2 and C3.  
What about the case of DifCat? In order to differentiate an undifferentiated 
general category into more specific sub-categories, extraction of differences 
rather than extraction of similarities holds a key role. Thus, in Figure 1, DifCat of 
C1 to form C2 and C3 will be done by extracting differences between C2 and C3. 
Notice, however, that extraction of differences is just the opposite side of the 
same coin of extraction of similarities in that, to the extent that one cannot detect 
similarities between X and Y, one can assume that X and Y are different.  
Accordingly, as long as the capacity for extracting both similarities and 
differences is endowed with, along with the ability for categorization (Cat for 
short), the two different modes of Cat (i.e. IntCat and DifCat) will result in con-
 
    4 As briefly touched on in Hoshi (2018), it is well known in biological evolution that, in the 
case of gene duplication, genes, chromosomes, or whole genomes will be duplicated and the 
duplicated element/region or its original element/region can drift to (a) new function(s) 
(see e.g. Ohno 1970, Zhang 2003). I am not claiming that this is the only possibility for this 
particular hypothesized biological evolutionary event in our species. This issue needs to be 
pursued in genetics and neurobiology in the future, while always keeping other possibilities 
in mind.  
    5 See also Sloutsky (2003) for some discussion on the role of similarity in the development of 
categorization. 
C1 
C2 C3 
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junction with extraction of similarities and extraction of differences, respectively. 
In a sense, what I argue for is a stricter reinterpretation of Lenneberg’s (1967) 
view that “the cognitive function underlying human language consists of an 
adaptation of a ubiquitous process (among vertebrates) of categorization and ex-
traction of similarities” (p. 374), regarding extraction of differences as the result 
of failure to extract similarities.  
In light of the consideration thus far, without mentioning the particular 
mode of IntCat, I will submit (unlike in Hoshi 2018) that Merge as a label-free 
recursive set-formation operation was derived from the inherently labeled recur-
sive set-formation complex cognitive operation of Cat, by ‘exapting/co-opting’ 
the recursive set-formation sub-component operation of Cat, detaching the 
labeling sub-component operation of it, while preserving the cognitive ability of 
Cat per se, in the course of biological evolution of the language capacity in our 
species.  
2.2. Low-Order Categorization and Higher-Order Categorization in Non-Human  
Animals and Humans: A More Fine-Grained Classification of Categorization 
In discussing categorization in Hoshi (2018), in particular IntCat, I provided a 
preliminary definition of the label κ for IntCat as a sort of characteristic function, 
as shown in (1) (see Hoshi 2018: 42):  
 
                            1 if x ∊ κ  
(1) κ(x) =    
                            0 if x ∉ κ 
 
For any element indicated by x, x either ‘satisfies’ the label κ or not. Then, I form-
ulated IntCat as an unordered set-formation under a particular label specified by 
κ, as shown in (2) (see Hoshi 2018: 42): 
 
(2) IntCatκ (x1, …, xn) = { x1, …, xn } (xi ∊ κ, 1≤ i ≤ n)  
 (xi is a target element for interrelational categorization and κ is a label, 
where the sequence in the set uniformly contains either a series of entities 
or a series of sets as the value of xi) 
 
While I acknowledged the existence of two kinds of IntCat in Hoshi (2018), as 
reflected in the expressions “either a series of entities or a series of sets” in (2), I 
did not provide any empirical rationale for postulating the two kinds of IntCat in 
this fashion and did not fully develop a more fine-grained classification of cate-
gorization. Hence, I will aim to fill this gap in the ensuing discussion. 
Since, as already argued above, reference to the particular mode of catego-
rization IntCat is not necessary, I will keep using the general term categorization 
(Cat) in what follows in addressing a more fine-grained classification of Cat in 
terms of the degree of order in categorization in non-human animals and humans, 
linking it to the context of biological evolution of language capacity.6 
 
    6 As Lenneberg (1967) already pointed out clearly, there are closely interrelated but in 
principle separate goals for the investigation into the phylogeny of human language: (i) 
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By way of the degree of order in categorization, I would like to differentiate 
between low-order categorization (low-order Cat) and higher-order categorization 
(higher-order Cat) as a first approximation. For ease of exposition, I will look at 
cases where only two individual instances or two sub-categories are involved, 
but as the formulation of Cat in (2) above shows, in principle, Cat is not restricted 
to being binary unlike Merge (see Hoshi 2018 for some relevant discussion). 
First, observe the following Figure 2 on low-order Cat.  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Low-order Cat (X, Y = individual instances/tokens; C= category label) 
 
What I mean by ‘low-order Cat’ refers to the point that there are no categories of 
categories involved and only categorization targeting individual objects (i.e. 
instances/tokens), including events, is at work. Two different individual in-
stances/tokens X and Y are interrelated under the category label C in Figure 2. 
For example, suppose X and Y correspond to two dogs as individual instances/ 
tokens, which are categorized under the label C (= the concept DOG or the proto-
concept DOG).7 
Hurford (2007: 12) remarks that “the advent of language does change the 
nature and range of concepts, but I will use the term concept broadly enough to 
attribute concepts to some animals”—differentiating the following three stages of 
concepts in terms of an evolutionary succession: proto-concepts à pre-linguistic 
concepts à (post-)linguistic concepts. I will embrace this kind of distinction of 
‘levels’ of concepts in the following discussion. Notice, however, that the distinc-
tion between low-order Cat and higher-order Cat, which is relevant to both non-
human animals and humans, is independent of such different ‘levels’ of concepts 
in Hurford (2007). 
Lenneberg (1967) already suggested that low-order Cat seems to be shared 
among (at least) all the vertebrates, and it has been suggested in the literature 
 
biological evolution of language capacity (see also Chomsky 2017), and (ii) cultural evolution 
of language (see also Tomasello 1999). Obviously, ontogeny of language enters into both the 
biological evolution of language capacity in (an) individual(s) among our hominin ancestors 
and the subsequent cultural evolution of language responsible for linguistic 
particularization and diversification in their own language community and those of their 
descendants (e.g., development of particular phonemic contrasts, conventional use of 
particular forms of grammatical constructions, grammaticalization, vocabulary expansion, 
etc.). I will set aside this important aspect of evolution of language in this contribution. 
    7 Regarding the term proto-concept, I will follow Hurford (2007) in assuming that it refers to 
whatever is instantiated in the brain that will enable animals to display “regular and 
systematic behavior in connection with some class of entities from the environment” 
(Hurford 2007: 16) and is related to “reflex actions” (Hurford 2007: 18). 
C 
                                                       
X        Y  
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that non-human animals are only capable of engaging themselves to low-order 
Cat, by which they will only categorically respond to individual objects (i.e. 
instances/tokens), including events, on the basis of sensory input stimuli from 
the immediate environment.  
For instance, Bickerton (1990) addresses a typical example of low-order Cat 
in non-human animals. In animals such as the vervet monkey with its alarm calls, 
the spots, roar, and smell of different perceptions of individual leopards as its 
predators all provoke a similar result of flight, which leads to the formation of a 
category ‘leopard’, which is a cognitive linking of the three different sensory 
modalities for the same behavioral response of flight (vision, audition, olfaction) 
(see also Bouchard 2013: Chaps. 4–5). I believe that this cognitive linking in the 
brain can be regarded as serving as the ‘label’ for low-order Cat in non-human 
animals, and presumably our non-linguistic hominin ancestors as well as modern 
humans, for that matter (see Mareschal et al. 2010 for a comprehensive discussion 
on concepts and categorization in both humans and non-human animals).  
Note that non-human animals do not and presumably our non-linguistic 
hominin ancestors did not possess the word leopard per se in their communication 
systems. At this point, in order to avoid confusion, let me hasten to add a caveat. 
As claimed in Hoshi (2018), I will keep distinguishing between labeling of 
categories and naming of categories. In fact, the distinction between these two 
processes can be traced back to Lenneberg (1967), who submits that the formation 
of a concept for categorization, which is equivalent to labeling of categories in my 
term, is prior to and more primitive than the attachment of ‘words’ (sound/sign 
patterns) to certain types of conceptualization, which is equivalent to naming of 
categories in my terms.8 In human language, concepts as the labels of a subset of 
all the possible categories in conceptualization are also ‘named’ and used for 
thought or communication.  
Thus, inasmuch as categories are shared and used for communication 
among conspecifics, it is expected that naming of categories is also to be observed 
among non-human animals to some degree. Alarm calls in monkeys in stimulus–
response behavior in animal communication systems might be a case in point 
(see, e.g., Seyfarth et al. 1980). 
Next, look at Figure 3 on higher-order Cat. Two separate categories C1 and 
C2 are subsumed under the super-category label C3. This is a case of higher-
order Cat, which implicates categorization of categories rather than categori-
zation of individual objects/events.  
 
    8 See also Murphy (2010) and the other papers in Mareschal et al. (2010) for a detailed 
discussion on human and non-human concepts. 
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Figure 3: Higher-order Cat (C1, C2 = category labels for sub-categories; C3 = category 
label for super-category) 
 
Let me illustrate this by using a simple example of part of taxonomic categories 
of foods (see also Hoshi 2018). Suppose you have formed a low-order category 
with the label ‘lemon’ indicated by C1, and likewise formed another low-order 
category with the label ‘tangerine’ indicated by C2. Then you will form a super-
category with the label ‘citrus fruits’ indicated by C3 by interrelating the two sub-
category sets on the basis of extraction of similarities between C1 and C2. This is 
an example of higher-order Cat, because here only categorization of categories is 
in operation.  
Spinozzi et al. (1999), Conway & Christiansen (2001), Penn et al. (2008), and 
Bouchard (2013), among others, state that only humans can engage in such 
higher-order Cat, that is, categorization of categories, beyond categorization of 
individual objects including events. On the other hand, Roberts & Mazmanian 
(1988) and Vonk & McDonald (2002, 2004) report that pigeons, monkeys, gorillas, 
and orangutans are also capable of dealing with higher-order Cat to some extent 
in addition to low-order Cat (see also Vauclair 2002 for more discussion on both 
low-order and higher-order Cat in non-human primates). 
Furthermore, as a concrete illustration of higher-order Cat in non-human 
animals, Blumstein (2007) and Rundus et al. (2007) report that mammals such as 
California ground squirrels not only distinguish between their predator snakes 
and the other stimuli in the external world but also differentiate rattlesnakes and 
gopher snakes, displaying different defensive behaviors to the two kinds of 
snakes.  
Yang (2013) provides a statistically robust demonstration that, while young 
children use a rule-based combinatorial power of grammar even at the earliest 
stages of language acquisition, primates lack the expected range of such a combi-
natorial grammar, which is based on a close examination of the sign combi-
nations used by an ASL-taught chimpanzee named Nim Chimpsky, reported in 
Terrace et al. (1979). This can be naturally interpreted as suggesting that primates 
lack Merge unlike human children. At the same time, however, he acknowledges 
that it is well-documented that non-human primates have the ability to learn 
word-like symbolic units, citing Savage-Rumbaugh et al. (1998) and Lyn et al. 
C3 
C1 C2 
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(2011). This seems to suggest that although primates lack Merge, they have the 
ability of Cat with the power of both low-order and some limited degree of 
higher-order. Note that to the extent that primates can make use of Cat, they can 
associate word-like units such as signs or artificial physical objects like plastic 
chips with the available (proto-)concepts as labels of Cat in a symbolic fashion in 
the process of naming of categories, although the link between such symbols for 
externalization and their associated (proto-)concepts is presumably not mediated 
by Merge and the syntactic objects (SOs) generated by it. 
Given that the possibility of higher-order Cat in non-human animals is not 
flatly denied, as discussed above, I will tentatively take the position that in 
principle at least some degree of higher-order Cat is available for non-human 
animals as well. 
Let us next turn to low-order and higher-order Cat in humans. At least as 
far as our species is concerned, insofar as the emergence of Merge was critical in 
our language and cognition, it is plausible to infer that it also had a great impact 
on Cat (both low-order and higher-order) in ‘post-Merge’ humans. In particular, I 
surmise that it made a significant contribution to diversifying a variety of 
concepts (both simplex and complex) to be employed as labels for Cat in them. 
One such contribution by Merge was its generating SOs as an infinite 
variety of combinations of concepts as lexical items, which were/have been 
employed as novel labels not only for low-order Cat but also for higher-order Cat 
in our species. For instance, the higher-order Cat in Figure 3, the label/name for 
the super-category ‘citrus fruits’ C3 that subsumes the sub-categories such as 
‘lemon’ C1 and ‘tangerine’ C2 was created by merging a concept corresponding 
to ‘citrus’ (i.e. the property of producing juicy fruits with a slightly sour taste) 
and another concept corresponding to ‘fruit’. 
Another possible form of contribution by Merge was its making available 
the formation of a variety of label-free root elements and categorizers as 
conceptual atoms as target elements of Merge, which lies behind the rich human 
language lexicon.9 For example, in Figure 3, suppose that C1 is the category with 
the label/name ‘mother’ and C2 is the category with the label/name ‘father’, 
where ‘mother’ and ‘father’ can be analyzed as something like {n, {√female, 
√parent}} and {n, {√male, √parent}}, respectively (n is a nominal categorizer; √female, 
√male, and √parent are category-free root elements). Then one can form the super-
category C3 with the label/name ‘parent’. Note that if n and √parent are merged, 
one would obtain {n, √parent}, which would give us the nominal ‘parent’ to be 
used for the label/name ‘parent’ for the higher-order Cat under discussion. 
I speculate that this kind of ‘lexical decomposition’ is possible due to the 
label-free nature of the ‘Merge formula’: Merge (X, Y) = {X, Y}. If you flip-flop it, 
you would obtain the ‘inverted Merge formula’: {X, Y} = Merge (X, Y). In 
analyzing primary linguistic data (PLD), human children could employ the 
schema expressed by the inverted Merge formula in forming lexical items X and 
Y, where X and Y are either root elements or categorizers.  
 
    9 See, e.g., Marantz (1997), Embick & Noyer (2007), Embick & Marantz (2008), Nóbrega & 
Miyagawa (2015), and Fujita (2017) for the treatment of word formation in the framework of 
Distributed Morphology (DM). 
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Accordingly, in this way, the evolutionary way to human-unique Cat and 
cognition was opened and paved. Thus, this affected the very nature of Cat in 
our species in a fundamental fashion in such a way that Merge-related higher-
order as well as low-order Cat became available in our species thanks to the 
advent of Merge, leading to what Tattersall (2017: 64) calls “the qualitative 
distinctness of both modern symbolic cognition and language.” 
In closing this section, modifying and generalizing Hoshi’s (2018) prelimi-
nary definition of IntCat, I will define Cat as a sort of recursive set-formation 
operation based on a characteristic function κ for a label of Cat. The category 
label is a characteristic function because it will sort out potential target objects, 
depending upon whether they ‘satisfy’ relevant concepts as labels or not. Also, 
Cat is a recursive set-formation operation, given that its output element (i.e. a 
category set) can serve as its input element(s) as well to the extent that an appro-
priate label for the Cat in question is available.  
Suppose that κ is the variable of a label for Cat, then κ can be taken as a sort 
of characteristic function that applies to any element indicated by x or X (where x 
is the variable for an entity and X is the variable for a category set of entities or a 
category set of category sets) that either ‘satisfies’ the label or not, as defined as 
follows:10 
 
(3)                                    1 if x or X satisfies κ  
 κ(x) or κ(X) =  
                                         0 if x or X does not satisfy κ 
 
On the basis of this characteristic function of the label κ, Cat for low-order and 
higher-order can be defined as a sort of recursive set-formation operation that 
takes two or more entities as in (4) or two or more category sets of entities or two 
or more category sets of category sets as in (5) and that yields one super-set 
category with an appropriate category label: 
  
(4) Low-order Catκ (x1, …, xn) = X = {xi | κ(xi)} (1≤ i ≤ n)  
[informally {x1, …, xn} (1≤ i ≤ n)] 
(The sequence in the resultant category set uniformly contains a series of 
different entities as values of xi.) 
 
(5) Higher-order Catκ (X1, …. Xn) = X = {Xi | κ(Xi)} (1≤ i ≤ n) 
[informally {X1, …, Xn}(1≤ i ≤ n)] 
(The sequence in the resultant category set uniformly contains a series of 
different category sets as values of Xi.) 
 
    10 Here, I am making a sort of idealization with respect to the label variable κ that serves as a 
characteristic function for categorization (Cat). In reality, as is well-known in the fields of 
psychology and cognitive linguistics, the criteria for membership determination/identifi-
cation for categories on the basis of extraction of similarities among category set members is 
flexible, nuanced and complicated (see among others Rosch 1973, Lakoff 1987, and Taylor 
2003). See also Lenneberg (1967: Chap. 8) for some discussion on this sort of characteristics 
of the classification criteria for categorization. 
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In summary, I will draw as Figure 4 the picture of the evolutionary relation 
between Cat and Merge that I have argued for in this section. 
 
 
                            
                   
                               
The degree of order is dependent on the availability of category 
labels on the basis of the cognitive power of extraction of similari-
ties/differences among category members in pre-Merge non-human 
animals (and possibly ‘pre-Merge’ human ancestors?). 
Figure 4: Low-order Cat & higher-order Cat in non-human animals  
 
 
                            
                   
                               
The degree of order is dependent on the availability of category 
labels on the basis of the power of extraction of similarities/ 
differences among category members, which is augmented by the 
generativity of Merge in ‘post-Merge’ humans.  
Figure 5: Low-order Cat & higher-order Cat (cum Merge) in humans   
 
Low-order Cat is shared among at least all the vertebrates and higher-order 
categorization is possibly possessed by some of them as well. If my hypothesis of 
the categorization origin of Merge and the prevalent assumption that Merge is a 
label-free recursive set-formation operation are on the right track, it follows that 
there is a crucial difference between non-human animals and humans with 
respect to the properties of low-order categorization and higher-order categori-
zation, given that SOs generated by Merge can be put to use as labels for Cat only 
in our species (see Hoshi 2018).11 
2.3. The Relation between Labeling in Categorization and Labeling in Syntax 
Based on neurocognitive considerations, Goucha et al. (2017) claim that labeling 
and not Merge is the evolutionary novelty that gave rise to the faculty of 
language (FL) in its present form. To the extent that Merge as a label-free 
recursive set-formation operation was exapted/co-opted from the recursive set-
formation sub-component of Cat, as I argued in the previous section, it is indeed 
the case that Merge in this sense is not the evolutionary novelty in line with 
Goucha et al. (2017). On the other hand, as long as labeling is also involved in Cat 
(Hoshi 2018), the real evolutionary novelties are the nature of labeling in syntax 
 
    11 It has been reported in the literature that non-human primates such as Old World monkeys 
are capable of combining two items but never more than two for their calls in communi-
cation (see Miyagawa & Clarke 2019 and references cited therein). To account for this fact, I 
will follow Miyagawa & Clarke (2019) in thinking that such two-item combination is not 
carried out by Merge but by the “dual-compartment frame into which each of the calls can 
fit” (p. 1). 
Low-order categorization Higher-order categorization (?)  
Low-order categorization 
(cum Merge) 
Higher-order categorization 
(cum Merge) 
Biolinguistics  «  Forum  « 
 
11 
in comparison with that of labeling in Cat and the constraint of binarity imposed 
on Merge.12 Ideally, at least part of the nature of labeling in syntax and the 
binarity condition on Merge input should be somehow related to the nature of 
labeling in Cat, if the hypothesis of categorization origin of Merge put forth in 
Hoshi (2018) and refined in this opinion piece is on the right track.13   
Goucha et al. (2017) submit that “the labeling of the outcome of the 
operation Merge is a necessary cognitive prerequisite for a complete account of 
the uniqueness of human language processing. It is through labeling that asym-
metrical hierarchical structures can originate, thus distinguishing language from 
other communication systems” (p. 14).  
However, labeling of a set per se is not a novelty in Merge at all, given that 
categorization (Cat) also inherently implicates labeling. Furthermore, strictly 
speaking, asymmetric hierarchical structures are not derived from labeling in and 
of itself, but originates from relative inclusion/containment relations holding 
among generated sets and elements within such sets regardless of labeling of 
those sets, interpreting such relative inclusion/containment relations in question 
as equivalent to asymmetric hierarchical structures.14 This is indeed the case, 
given that the current formulation of Merge is independent of labeling and 
syntactic hierarchical structuring is implemented via unbounded application of 
Merge under the bare phrase structure system in the current minimalist program 
(Chomsky 2013, 2015).   
Labeling of SOs is required to identify the nature of SOs, not to determine 
the hierarchical structuring of SOs, at the CI and SM interfaces. Rather, the 
hierarchical nature of syntactic structures of human language arises due to the 
specific mode of application of Merge per se. Note that Merge is a binary 
recursive unordered set-formation operation, which allows for taking in not only 
conceptual atoms such as lexical items but also its own output elements as its 
input elements. Crucially, this in turn requires that any unordered set generated 
by Merge must be in the state of being closed off once each application of Merge 
has been completed. Suppose X and Y are merged to yield an unordered set, 
hence Merge (X, Y) = {X, Y}. If this set is closed off, then merging of Z with this 
set would produce the following ‘structured’ unordered set {Z, {X, Y}}: 
 
(6) Merge (Z, {X, Y}) = {Z, {X, Y}}     (ß a hierarchical structure) 
 
If {X, Y} were not closed off, then merging of Z with this set would give the 
following ‘unstructured’ unordered set {Z, X, Y}: 
 
 
    12 Strictly speaking, there is at least one more evolutionary novelty: The target elements of 
Merge are either lexical items or SOs generated by Merge. I will not address the important 
issue of evolutionary origins of lexical items in human language in this opinion piece. 
    13 See also Boeckx (2009), Hornstein (2009), and Murphy (2015), inter alia, for other decompo-
sitional approaches to the evolution of Merge, which are different from mine. 
    14 Note that exactly the same asymmetrical hierarchical structures obtain among categories 
‘generated’ by Cat as well (see Hoshi 2018 for some discussion). Note also that those 
inclusion/containment relations among sets and elements within such sets are created by 
the recursive nature of the relevant set-formation operation, which is shared by Merge and 
Cat, pace Hauser et al. (2002), if the hypothesis of categorization origin of Merge is correct. 
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(7) Merge (Z, {X, Y}) = {Z, X, Y}    (ß a flat structure) 
 
As such, the hierarchical structuring of SOs as exemplified by (6) can arise thanks 
to the inclusion/containment relations holding among ‘layered sets and elements 
within such sets’ generated by unbounded recursive application of Merge with 
its ‘close-off’ property. In the pre-minimalist generative framework, dominance 
relations are defined against two-dimensional tree-diagrammatic phrase 
structures or X-bar structures, which virtually determine hierarchical structural 
relations among elements in them. On the other hand, in the bare phrase 
structure approach, such dominance relations cannot be directly defined but 
must be indirectly defined via set inclusion/containment relations (see, e.g., 
Chomsky 2000).  
While labeling of a set is not unique to syntax proper as discussed so far, 
the nature of labeling seems to differ between syntax and categorization. What 
seems to be unique to the labeling of SOs and different from the labeling of 
categories is that, in the latter, members in category sets are equal and symmetric 
in status, and so extraction of similarities with respect to the label is required to 
determine membership; whereas, in the former, members in SOs are not equal 
and asymmetric in status, and so the label is determined on the basis of asym-
metric nature of members of SOs (e.g., categorizers vs. label-free root elements; 
see the discussion below).  
Now, I will reformulate and elaborate on my hypothesis from Hoshi (2018) 
concerning the categorization origin of Merge and labeling, as depicted in Figure 
6. (Note that the requirement that SOs generated by Merge will be subject to 
labeling stems from the fact that they will be employed for labeling of Cat (both 
low-order and higher-order) in our species.) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Evolutionary Relations among Cat, Merge, and Labeling 
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In the minimalist program, the binary nature of Merge has been one of the 
recalcitrant puzzles of human language. Chomsky (2008), for instance, tries to 
account for the binarity of Merge by appealing to the third factor principle of 
minimal computation, also suggesting other possibly conspiring conditions such 
as requirements of linearization at the SM interface along the lines of Kayne’s 
(1994) Linear Correspondence Axiom, and conditions of predicate–argument 
structure at the CI interface.  
However, as Fujita (2017) points out correctly, explanation of the nature of 
binarity of Merge by the third-factor principle of minimal computation does not 
seem to carry much force, because nothing in principle would prevent it from 
applying to other cognitive domains equally as well, so it could not provide the 
FL-specific property in Merge. Recall that, for example, the cardinality of the 
target of categorization is not restricted to two, as discussed in comparison with 
Merge in Hoshi (2018).     
If my hypothesis of categorization origin of Merge and labeling illustrated 
in Figure 6 is on the right track, it would provide an alternative account for the 
binarity of Merge on the basis of the nature of labeling, which I claim to be 
originally due to the sub-component of Cat. First of all, keep in mind that the 
labeling procedure for both Merge and Cat can be taken as a procedure for the 
purpose of identifying what kind of set in question is for Merge and Cat. Recall 
from section 2.2 that the identity of a category will be determined by the labeling 
procedure for characterizing a category set which is specified by the form κ(x)/ 
κ(X), where κ is a characteristic function that will apply to any element x/X, in 
conjunction with the (non-)extraction of similarities related to κ among any 
member x/X of that category. Thus, there are two elements involved in the form 
κ(x)/κ(X), viz. one is a function and the other is its argument.  
 
 
       κ(x)/κ(X)        
 
 
 
 
 
Function            Argument   
 
Figure 7: Binarity of Merge as Imposition of the Function–Argument Pattern of Categorial 
Labeling Schema    
 
Notice that a function can be regarded as the label of any syntactic object SO 
under this conception. Even {XP, YP} structures such as the subject–predicate 
configuration {nP, vP}, either XP or YP can be taken as a function, hence the label 
of the whole set {XP, YP}. Thus, in {nP, vP}, for instance, vP is the function and nP 
is its argument, so vP will serve as the label for the whole set {nP, vP}.15     
 
    15 Notice that this view of labeling is incompatible with Chomsky’s (2013, 2015) thesis that the 
subject-predicate {XP, YP} structure and the intermediate wh-movement configuration {XP, 
categorical label κ is a function 
that takes x/X as its argument  
binarity with a function and its argument 
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Suppose that, in the process of biological evolution of Merge illustrated in 
Figure 6, the ‘function–argument binary’ nature of the labeling procedure of Cat 
was imposed upon the recursive set-formation operation ‘exapted/co-opted’ 
from the recursive set-formation sub-component of Cat. Presumably, this would 
yield the binary requirement of Merge. At the same time, this claim has a 
significant consequence on the very nature of label in syntax. Notice that the label 
per se for Cat corresponds to a function rather than its argument. Thus, it is 
expected that the label, say, X in the SO {X, Y} generated by Merge, should be a 
function rather than its argument for determining the identity of the SO by the 
labeling procedure.  
The typical case of X and Y as a categorizer (n, v, a, p) and a root element √R, 
respectively, can be regarded as a categorizer being a function that takes a root 
element as its argument to yield a particular label of the whole set {X, Y}, such as 
‘nominal’, ‘verbal’, ‘adjectival’, ‘prepositional/postpositional’. By the same token, 
when the set generated by Merge is {T, vP} or {C, TP}, the traditional functional 
category head T and C would be taken as a function that receives an eventuality 
expressed by vP as its argument, yielding a tensed eventuality (i.e. a situation), 
and a function that accepts a tensed eventuality/situation expressed by TP as its 
argument, giving out a tensed eventuality/situation with a force (i.e. a propo-
sition), respectively, along the lines of Ramchand & Svenonius (2014). 
At this point, the reader might wonder about the status of the labeling such 
as <φ, φ> under φ-feature agreement and <Q, Q> under Q-feature agreement 
implicating internal Merge of the subject and a wh-element in languages like 
English (see Chomsky 2013, 2015). Notice that this labeling pattern is quite differ-
ent from the labeling pattern observed in the categorizer–root element structure 
on the basis of the categorizer as the label due to its status of a function.  
In fact, if the line of analysis developed in this section is correct, neither <φ, 
φ> nor <Q, Q> can be a proper label for any SO {X, Y} in narrow syntax (NS) in 
the first place. In my view, labeling like <φ, φ> and <Q, Q> should be excluded 
from NS and the mapping from NS to the CI interface. The claim that agreement 
phenomena, including both φ-feature agreement and Q-feature agreement, are 
morpho-phonological in nature and do not belong to NS does not sound far-
fetched, if we extend Marantz’s (1991) and McFadden’s (2004) idea that case/ 
Case is a purely morphological phenomenon to both φ-feature agreement and Q-
feature agreement.  
One possibility is that agreement is a kind of ‘extraction of similarities’ 
which was ‘exapted/co-opted’ from Cat as a potential device in natural language 
and came to be employed in a subset of the whole set of natural language in the 
mapping from NS to the SM interface (note that East Asian languages like 
Japanese, Korean, and Chinese do not display φ-feature agreement, as is widely 
known in the literature; see, e.g., Fukui 1986 et seq. for Japanese). Thus, under the 
 
YP} structure will necessitate obligatory extraction of either XP or YP to guarantee the 
labeling of the {XP, YP} structure. Hence, the reason for such extraction must be sought 
elsewhere. Note, also, that this view of labeling is not necessarily incompatible with Moro’s 
(2000) analysis of small clauses, given that the small clause {XP, YP} is still ambiguous under 
my view in that both XP and YP could be either a predicate or an argument here as it stands, 
which may necessitate extraction of either XP or YP.  
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present line of analysis, <φ,φ> and <Q,Q> at {nP/DP, TP} and {wh-nP/DP, CP} in 
the traditional term seem to represent results of extraction of certain similarities 
(i.e. having φ-feature and Q-feature) by the minimal search of φ-bearing and Q-
bearing elements in the SO set for the purpose of interpretation at the SM 
interface system (phonology/morphology) in FL. Consequences of this stand on 
labeling are far-reaching and I would like to leave investigation of them on the 
basis of concrete analysis of relevant empirical data in natural language to 
another occasion. 
 
3. Parallelism of Laterality between Syntactic Processing and Categorization 
cum Extraction of Similarities 
Given the hypothesis of categorization origin of Merge and the well-established 
fact that syntactic processing is implemented by the dorsal pathway connecting 
the pars opercularis (BA 44) in the posterior inferior frontal lobe and the posterior 
superior temporal gyrus/middle temporal gyrus in the temporal lobe in the left 
hemisphere (see Friederici 2017, Goucha et al. 2017, inter alia), it is expected that 
categorization (Cat) should also be implemented neutrally in the left hemisphere 
as well.  
The interaction between the frontal cortex and the temporal cortex (both 
lateral and medial) is at work in categorization processes (Goucha et al. 2017; see 
Freedman et al. 2003 for such interaction between the frontal and temporal cortex 
for categorization in primates). Rogers et al. (2013: 131) point out that there is a 
close relation between the left hemisphere and categorization, citing Kosslyn et al. 
(1992), who demonstrate that “quantitative judgments by humans of the distance 
between objects are faster in the left visual field (right hemisphere), whereas at 
least some categorical judgments (e.g., above/below or connected/unconnected) 
are faster in the right visual field (left hemisphere).”  
Vallortigara et al. (1999: 168) note that the fact that the left hemisphere is 
specialized for language and speech “could, in a sense, be regarded as a manifes-
tation of a more general ‘categorizing’ ability of this hemisphere” and that this 
left hemisphere asymmetrical bias for the function of categorization holds in both 
birds and mammals (see also Denenberg 1981). On the basis of this observation, 
they suggest that this lateralization “emerged early in vertebrate evolution” from 
a phylogenetic point of view. 
Reviewing the literature on the biology and behavior of brain asymmetries 
in humans and non-human animals, Rogers et al. (2013) note that the left hemi-
sphere control is required for assessment of a stimulus for its categorization by 
focusing attention to local features of the environment and that “the left hemi-
sphere is specialized to attend to similarities or invariances between stimuli, in 
order to allocate stimuli into categories following rules established through expe-
rience or biological predispositions” (p. 27). 
In light of the parallelism of left hemisphere lateralization on the function 
of language, particularly syntax, and the function of categorization, the same left-
side lateralizational bias for the two cognitive functions does not seem to be a 
mere accident. In fact, citing Vallortigara et al. (1999) and Rogers et al. (2013), 
Corballis (2002) suggest that the parallelism between the left hemisphere asym-
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metrical bias for the function of categorization observed among vertebrates and 
the one for the function of language in our species indicates that categorization 
shared among vertebrates might be a precursor to language. However, since, 
strictly speaking, language as a whole is not lateralized to the left hemisphere 
(see, e.g., Hickok & Poeppel 2007, Friederici 2017), it is more appropriate to state 
that categorization shared among vertebrates might be a precursor to Merge, as 
claimed by the hypothesis of categorization origin of Merge.   
Using transcranial direct current stimulation on human subjects, Lupyan et 
al. (2012) demonstrate that the selection of properties relevant for categorization 
is related to the regulatory function of the inferior frontal gyrus including Broca’s 
area in the left hemisphere. This can be interpreted as implying that the inferior 
frontal gyrus is involved in labeling of categorization. 
If syntactic processing consists of both Merge and labeling and binarity of 
Merge is related to the categorial labeling schema as claimed above, it might 
suggest that the neural connection between BA44 and the posterior superior/ 
middle temporal gyri is responsible for labeling and binarity of Merge and Merge 
as a pure recursive set-formation operation is implemented by a different brain 
region or network. Without further discussion in this opinion piece, on the basis 
of the ‘basal ganglia grammar’ model defended by Lieberman (2000, 2002, 2006), 
Balari & Lorenzo (2013), and Balari et al. (2013), I tentatively regard the basal 
ganglia as being mainly responsible for implementing the label-free recursive set-
formation operation in Merge as part of its multi-purpose operation in conjunct-
tion with different neural connections for different functions in the brain. In fact, 
Teichmann et al. (2015) discovered a crucial cortical-subcortical ‘syntax’ pathway 
linking Broca’s area and the striatum in the basal ganglia. More specifically, they 
identified the BA45-left caudate head pathway in combination with the dorsal 
arcuate-BA44 pathway as responsible for phrasal level syntactic processing (see 
also references cited therein).  
While a comprehensive investigation into this issue goes well beyond the 
scope of this piece, I would like to make a remark on this issue in light of the 
hypothesis of categorization origin of Merge that I proposed here. Although the 
emergence of Merge in the faculty of language seems to be a relatively recent 
adaptation of our species, if my hypothesis of categorization origin of Merge is 
on the right track, it does not necessarily indicate that Merge must be imple-
mented solely by some neural network located in the neocortex, as suggested 
here.16  
 
4. Concluding Remarks  
In this opinion piece, I have addressed the three issues that I touched on but did 
not sufficiently discuss in Hoshi (2018). Those are (i) the relation between two 
modes of operation of categorization, viz., the interrelational mode of categori-
zation (IntCat) and the differentiational mode of categorization (DifCat); (ii) the 
 
    16 See Lenneberg (1967) for the view that the function of language should be regarded as the 
result of not only the horizontal interaction within the neocortex but also the vertical 
interaction between the neocortex and the subcortical structures. See also Theofanopoulou & 
Boeckx (2016) for recent discussion on a similar view. 
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relation between two levels of categorization, viz. low-order and higher-order 
categorization in humans and non-human animals; and (iii) the evolutionary 
relation between labeling in categorization and labeling in syntax.  
Concerning (i), I claimed that the two apparently distinct modes of oper-
ation of categorization (IntCat and DifCat) stem from differences of ‘extraction 
patterns’ and thus as a precursor of Merge the particular mode of categorization 
such as IntCat should not be stipulated. As for (ii), I clarified the relation between 
low-order categorization, involving a series of entities, and higher-order categori-
zation, involving a series of category sets, in humans and non-human animals, in 
connection with the qualitative difference of the two types of categorization 
between them in the context of evolution of human language. Finally, with 
regard to (iii), I made a specific claim about the relation between labeling in cate-
gorization and labeling in syntax, proposing a possible novel explanation of the 
binary nature of Merge with respect to its input cardinality on the basis of the 
very nature of the origin of labeling for SOs from labeling for categorization. 
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